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Russia’s response to the Arab Spring ranged from apprehension to deep anxiety and 
diverged significantly from US and EU responses. While initially welcoming the 
popular demands for political reform in the Middle East, the Russian reaction rapidly 
became more critical as developments in the region resulted in Western military 
intervention and there was increased concern over the spread of Islamist extremism. It 
was these twin fears which prompted the Russian leadership to adopt a strong and 
uncompromising stance towards Syria, seeking to ensure that, unlike in Libya, there 
would be no Western intervention in support of the overthrow of the existing regime 
and a secular state would be preserved. While geopolitical factors certainly played a 
role in the adoption of this strategic stance, domestic political factors were more 
significant, particularly since the Arab Spring coincided with unprecedented levels of 
domestic Russian contestation during the 2011-12 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. As the Russian leadership felt internally threatened by the growing 
opposition within the country, the civil war in Syria and the increased levels of 
instability in much of the rest of the Middle East became an exemplification of the 
perceived flaws of the external imposition of Western liberal democracy and the 
virtues of Russian’s own distinctive model of state-managed political order. There 
was, as such, a significant ideational and ideological dimension to the Russian 
response to the Arab Spring, challenging the very legitimacy and efficacy of Western 
promotion of  liberal democracy. 
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 One of the unforeseen outcomes of the tumultuous developments of the Arab 
Spring is that Russia has emerged as a significantly more influential and powerful 
strategic presence in the Middle East, reminiscent to some degree of the Soviet role 
during the Cold War period. In relation to Syria, in particular, Russia was willing to 
countenance a degree of diplomatic confrontation with the West which is unparalleled 
since the end of the Cold War. Russia was also willing to provide significant support 
to a Syrian regime which is treated as an illegitimate pariah by most other regional 
and international actors. However, in the end, this diplomatic and political strategy 
proved to be astute and to reap dividends. In September 2013, when the US and its 
allies were on the brink of military intervention into Syria, a Russian diplomatic 
initiative to secure the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical weapons averted the threat 
of military strikes. It also led to a significant US-Russian rapprochement which led to 
the convening of the Geneva Conference in January 2014 and was the first time that 
all the major participants to the conflict, including the Syrian regime itself, were 
present. The need for such a comprehensive meeting as a pre-condition to forge a 
peace has been a constant demand of Russia and bringing all the parties together in 
Geneva was perceived in Moscow as a vindication of its earlier diplomatic stance.   
 
  The principal aim of this article is to identify and evaluate the evolution of 
Russia’s approach towards the Arab Spring. The first part of the article assesses the 
initial Russian response to the developments of the Arab Spring. This was, at the start, 
relatively low-key, reflecting the limited economic and political ties with Egypt and 
Tunisia. But there was undoubtedly apprehension over these developments even at 
this time, which contrasted with the more positive assessments from the US, the EU 
and Turkey, as highlighted in other contributions to this volume. Russian anxieties did 
though intensify with the conflict in Libya which resulted in Muammar Gaddafi’s 
removal from power in October 2011 supported by Western military intervention. 
This crisis led to an unprecedented internal debate within Russia where the more 
hardline viewpoint of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gained ascendance, and where 
Western intervention into Libya was viewed as representing a fundamental  challenge 
to core Russian national interests. Increasingly, the Russian government and Russian 
analysts saw the Arab Spring as strengthening and consolidating Islamist extremism 
which was viewed as undermining stability not just in the Middle East but also 
potentially within Russia itself. 
 
 This sceptical and negative perceptions of the Arab Spring, rejecting the idea 
that this was a positive process of democratization, was mirrored in the approach 
taken by Israel, as set out by Magen in this volume. However, unlike Israel, Russia 
had significantly greater capacities to promote its preferences for managing and 
resolving the conflict. The second part of this article assesses the policies and 
instruments that Russia used to promote its strategic interventions into the region, 
most notably in Syria. In the main, these were diplomatic in nature, though there was 
also the cultivation of the perception that Russia could, if it so wished, escalate the 
crisis through arms sales or more direct support for the Syrian regime. In reality, 
Russia did provide substantive diplomatic, economic and political support to the 
Syrian regime, which led to a severe cooling of relations between Russia and the West 
as well as with many moderate Arab states. However, Russian strategy was always 
carefully calibrated and there was no desire irretrievably to damage its long-term 
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relations with the US and other Western and Arab states. Thus, when the opportunity 
came for the US and Russia to work together, such as over the dismantlement of 
Syria’s chemical weapons, Russia was keen to rebuild and improve relations and not 
to continue to emphasise the differences in their political positions over Syria. There 
was also a conscious exercise of self-restraint in Russia to limit their satisfaction and 
sense of schadenfreude that the West had come to adopt the longer-term Russian 
anxiety about how the Arab Spring had intensified Islamist extremism in the Middle 
East. 
 
 The final section of this article addresses the main factors which explain why 
Russia adopted the approach that it did to the Arab Spring and to the conflict in Syria. 
The main argument here is that, while geopolitical factors undoubtedly played a 
significant role in promoting Russia’s distinctive stance, there were also significant 
domestic political factors as well as an ideological and ideational dimension. Indeed, 
in this case, the domestic and ideational factors have a stronger explanatory force. 
Domestic factors were important as the events of the Arab Spring occurred at a time 
of significant electoral tension within Russia during the 2011-12 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. The ideational factors include the development in Russia, 
particularly by official government-supporting analysts and thinkers, of a specific 
conceptualisation of democracy which is essentially illiberal and anti-Western in its 
orientation, and which places much greater weight on the need for gradual stability-
prioritising and state-led change rather than the more pluralist role played by civil 
society inherent in the liberal democratic model. Whether or not the Russian concept 
of ‘sovereign democracy’ is really a democratic model or just a variant of 
authoritarianism, the sense that this model was more appropriate for promoting 
change in the Middle East rather than Western-supported regime change was a factor 
behind the stance taken by Russia. Indeed, the Russian perception is that their 
overarching prognosis has tended to be supported by political developments in the 
majority of the states affected by the Arab Spring in the period from 2012-14. 
 
Russian Assessment of the Arab Spring 
  
 It was, though, certainly not evident at the start of the Arab Spring that such a 
negative and pessimistic outcome of the Arab was inevitable or pre-ordained. Most 
Western and popular Arab sentiment was generally optimistic that a new era was 
dawning and that this presaged a decisive shift towards democracy. The Russian 
leadership was also keen not to be seen as a reactionary force, denying the legitimate 
democratic aspirations of the Arab world. Putin himself regularly affirmed that the 
social dynamics resulting in the Arab Spring were both positive and necessary and the 
‘sympathies of Russians were on the side of those struggling for democratic reforms’ 
(Putin 2013).  The initial developments in Tunisia and Egypt also initially appeared to 
present no significant threat or disruption to Russian interests, given the relatively 








 There was nevertheless an unavoidable parallel between the expression of the 
democratic impulses of the Arab peoples in Cairo and Tunis and Russians who were 
beginning to demonstrate in their thousands in Moscow and other Russian cities. The 
onset of the Arab Spring occurred at particularly sensitive moment in Russia’s 
political cycle with the run-up to the 2011 parliamentary elections and the 2012 
presidential elections. The central question of these elections was the future political 
role of Putin who, in the previous elections, had swapped jobs with Dmitry Medvedev 
and became Prime Minster while Medvedev moved to the Presidency. The big 
political issue which dominated Russian speculation ever since that re-shuffling in 
2008 was Putin’s future and whether a new leadership would emerge for the next 
elections. This was resolved in an abrupt, and to many Russians, highly cynical 
manner in the Spring of 2011 when it was peremptorily announced that Putin and 
Medvedev would again swap jobs and Putin would have a third term as President. The 
cynical stage management of this, the evidence of  electoral vote rigging, and a 
general dissatisfaction with the corrupt and authoritarian nature of Russian politics, 
led to unprecedented opposition rallies during 2011 and 2012. 
 
 The linkage between the pro-democracy developments in the Middle East and 
those in Russia was picked up as a theme by Russian commentators and opposition 
forces (see Sokolov 2011). However, Russian analysis also highlighted the different 
political situation in the Middle East how what was happening there was more akin to 
the revolutionise in 1989 in East Central Europe rather than with the ‘coloured’ 
revolutions of the 2000s. In addition, emphasis was accorded to the differing political 
culture in Europe compared to the Middle East, where Islam plays such a strong role 
in mitigating against a democratic culture. There was, as a result, a much greater 
scepticism and ambivalence about the democratic potential of the Arab Spring 
revolutions than found in most Western analyses.  
 
 This pessimism did not entail an unconditional support for the ruling secular 
Arab authoritarian regimes. Among Russian analysts, there was a recognition that 
these regimes had been in power too long, had become too corrupt, and had failed to 
reflect the changing nature of their societies (see Ivanov, 2013, pp. 8-32). However, 
the critical divergence from Western analysis was that the Arab Spring was rarely if 
ever viewed as part of an inexorable process towards democracy. The dominant 
narrative among Russian analysts was that the Arab Spring was much more a return to 
the traditional values of Middle Eastern societies, incorporating a more Islamic 
identity, than a shift to Western-style democracy. The narrative was thus couched 
primarily in terms of Islamization than of democratization.  This again is explicitly 
expressed in Putin’s own reflections on developments in the Middle East when, in an 
interview in August 2013, he argued that Russia is not, as many in the West argue, 
against the need for radical reform in Syria and that Russia is not just unreservedly 
supporting Asad but that a simplistic understanding of democracy, supported and 
promoted by the West, was a major factor in the violence in the region;  
 
In my opinion, this is happening because some people from outside believe that if the 
region were to be bought into compliance with a certain idea – an idea that some call 
democracy – then peace and stability would ensue. That’s not how it works. You can’t 




 There was, therefore, a recognition that an inevitable transformation was 
taking place in the Arab world and that there was a historical logic and inevitability 
about it, but that this change is not to be viewed through the prism of western-style 
democracy but in terms of a broad-based societal yearning for a more authentic and 
traditional Islamic identity. This passing of an old order is viewed with some 
wistfulness and nostalgia by Russian analysts, even while accepting its inevitability. 
As one senior Russian diplomat notes, what is happening is a shift of power from the 
Soviet-educated secular leftist Arab generation to a younger Islamist generation that 
has less affection and more limited historical ties with post-Soviet Russia (Lukmanov, 
2013, p. 104). 
 
 Russian analyses also tend to converge on this perception that the old secular 
Arab nationalist model is out-moded and that the struggle is now between moderate 
political Islam, such as with sections of the Muslim Brotherhood, and radical Islamist 
extremism, represented by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This conceptualization of a 
bifurcated internal civil war between moderate and extremist Islam is deeply 
embedded in Russian thinking and has its sources in Russia’s own experiences of 
dealing with the Muslim world (Dannreuther, 2010). From the Russian perspective, 
the Soviet/Russian state has been engaged in an almost continuous struggle against 
Islamist extremism from the late 1970s onwards. This extends from the Soviet 
experience in Afghanistan, to the Islamist civil war in Tajikistan, and to the 
insurgency in Chechnya in the North Caucasus, which notably shifted in the late 
1990s from being a mainly nationalist secessionist to a more radical Islamist struggle. 
In the mid-2000s, the Islamization of the Chechen insurgency mutated further into a 
more generalized Islamist insurgency in the whole of the North Caucasus that 
continues to threaten the stability of the North Caucasus region.  
 
 In the ideological world-view of Putin and his advisers, the root cause of this 
serious internal threat was the ‘false promise’ of  Western-style democracy promoted 
in the 1990s. Democracy became critically identified with the loss of the sovereign 
power of the centre through devolution and federalization, as most famously 
expressed by former President Yeltsin’s call for the Russian regions ‘to grab as much 
sovereignty as possible’. For Putin, it was precisely this loss of power of the central 
state, and the devolution of power to the periphery, which resulted in a vacuum that, 
in the North Caucasus, led to chaos, civil war and the rise of a radical anti-Russian 
Islamist extremist challenge.  
  
 There was, therefore, a deeply held conviction, drawn from Putin’s direct 
experience, that viewed the Western export of liberal democracy as a recipe for 
internal conflict, state disintegration, and chaos. This significantly informed and 
added to the apprehension and anxiety over developments in relation to the Arab 
Spring. A deep suspicion and distrust of Western intervention has also been a constant 
theme in post-Soviet Russian strategic thinking, where Western interventions, 
justified on humanitarian grounds, into Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 were 
generally perceived in Russia to be a smokescreen for a deliberate strategy of NATO 
expansion (Dannreuther, 1999-2000). There was always, therefore, a potential threat 
in Russian eyes that the Arab Spring might provide the West with a further 
opportunity to engage in regime change through the justification of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’. Ensuring against such Western intervention was, therefore, a key goal 
of Russian policymaking.  
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Russian Policies towards the Conflicts in Libya and Syria 
 
 These concerns and anxieties became increasingly acute with the evolution of 
events in Libya. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyan regime did not swiftly 
capitulate to the demands of the opposition, but rather threatened brutally to crush that 
opposition. The dilemma for Russia was whether it should support a Western-
sponsored resolution at the UN Security Council which aimed to provide protection 
for Libyan civilians under threat from Gaddafi’s forces. Medvedev was inclined to 
support the Western initiative, believing it was critical to preserve the ‘reset’ agenda, 
including Russian entry into the WTO and the new START treaty, and that it was not 
worth jeopardizing this for an isolated Arab leader with almost no support in the 
wider Arab world (Suslov, 2012). However, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
recommended vetoing the resolution. Vitaly Churkin, the Russian permanent 
representative to the UN, explicitly warned about the ‘inclusion of provisions in the 
document that potentially open the door for large-scale military intervention’ 
(Grigoriev, 2011). The eventual compromise was that Russia abstained from 
Resolution 1973. Once the resolution was passed, NATO initiated air strikes and 
provided military support to the opposition which contributed to the overthrow of the 
Gaddafi regime. 
 
 This decision not to veto this resolution was, though, challenged by Putin 
(then Prime Minister) who noted that the resolution was ‘deficient and flawed’ and 
that it ‘allows anyone to do anything they want – to take any actions against a 
sovereign state. Basically, all that this reminds me of is a medieval appeal for a 
crusade’ (Ivanov and Kuzlov, 2011). Medvedev immediately responded saying it ‘was 
absolutely inexcusable to use expressions that, in effect, lead to a clash of civilisations 
– such as “crusades” and so forth’ (Demchenko 2012). At the time, it appeared that 
this unprecedented clash between the two figures at the heart of the leadership 
duopoly might be just another example of the stage management of differences of 
opinion, with a message carefully calculated to meet the differing expectations of a 
foreign as against a domestic audience (Samarina 2011). However, in retrospect, this 
internal dispute can be seen as a critical turning point when Medvedev’s ambition for 
a second presidential term was significantly weakened. The NATO air strikes in 
support of the Libyan opposition and thus in support, from a Russian perspective, of 
‘regime change’ was a significant embarrassment for Medvedev and shifted elite 
support and public popularity towards Putin (Suslov 2012).  
 
 Taking a much more forceful and uncompromising posture towards 
developments in Libya was not just driven by electoral factors. There was also a 
strong conviction in Putin’s distinctive world-view that the Arab Spring was now 
going badly wrong. Thus, despite his earlier support for the uprisings, Putin noted that 
‘it became quickly clear that events in many of these countries were not turning out 
according to a civilized scenario. Instead of the affirmation of democracy, instead of 
defending the rights of the minority, there was increasingly the expulsion of the 
enemy, coup d’états, where the domination of one side becomes an ever greater 
aggressive domination of the other’ (Putin, 2012). The West, if not the sole cause of 
this deterioration, was, according to Putin  exacerbating the situation as these negative 
developments ‘were made worse by intervention from outside in support of one side 
of the internal conflict and the forceful character of that intervention. It led to a 
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number of governments under the cover of humanitarian slogans and with the aid of 
air power dividing the Libyan regime. And the apotheosis of this was not even a 
medieval but simply a brutal elimination of Muammar Gaddafi’. The firm conclusion 
that Putin draws from this is that ‘we must not allow the “Libyan scenario” to be 
attempted to be reproduced in Syria’ (ibid.). 
 
 It is this broader context of a resolute opposition to Western military 
intervention to support opposition forces to existing regimes which provides an 
explanation for why, after Libya, the Russian stance towards Syria was so 
uncompromising. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, argued that ‘the way 
the Syrian crisis is resolved will largely determine the model for the international 
community’s response to internal conflicts in the future’ (Chernenko and Yusin, 
2012). The Syrian crisis became, as such, a litmus test for confronting the whole issue 
of humanitarian intervention in the similar way that the Russian intervention into 
Georgia in 2008 was primarily driven by the perceived need to set ‘red lines’ against 
NATO enlargement into the post-Soviet space.  
 
 The principal instruments that Russia utilised in pursuit of its objectives in 
Syria were primarily diplomatic rather than military or economic in nature. This 
included the exercise of its power of veto in the UN Security Council to block the 
imposition of sanctions or authorise military action against the Syrian regime. Russia 
managed to block votes against Syria at three critical junctures in the UN during 2011 
and 2012. In ensuring the inaction of the UN, Russia was willing to be diplomatically 
isolated to an unprecedented degree, such as with the second major UN Resolution in 
February 2012 when its sole ally in not voting for the resolution was China. Russia 
was also willing to take the considerable risk of providing support for Asad even at 
times when the Syrian regime appeared close to collapse. This diplomatic strategy 
did, though, mean that Russia did not have to use other more confrontational and 
escalatory instrument. The absence of a arms sanctions regime against Syria meant 
that Russia could continue to supply ‘defensive weapons’ to the Syrian regime. Russia 
also justified its support for Asad on the grounds that, to do otherwise, would be to 
pre-judge the political process in Syria and that any settlement would have to include 
direct talks and negotiations between the regime and the opposition. 
 
 There was certainly a politico-military as well as a diplomatic dimension to 
Russian policy towards the Syrian conflict. Russian warships patrolled, from time to 
time, waters close to Syria and used the port of Tartus, which is one of the few foreign 
naval bases available to the Russian navy. Russian military advisers provided support 
and advice to their counterparts in the Syrian army. There was also the intermittent 
diplomatic threat that Russia could, if pressed too far, provide weapons to Syria, such 
as the S-300 anti-missile system, which would significantly shift the strategic balance 
in the region. There was also the inevitable reality that Western policy-makers could 
not exclude in their military contingency planning a Russian military reaction if the 
West did militarily intervene in Syria.  
 
 But the Russian leadership and analysts also calculated that the actual risk of 
this leading to a significant military escalation with the West was  limited. There was 
based on an underlying assessment that the West was in reality deeply hesitant about a 
military intervention into Syria. There was a calculation that the formal Western 
stance of supporting the opposition goals of overthrowing the Asad regime was never 
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likely to succeed without substantial Western military support for these forces and 
that Western publics lacked the appetite for this. The likely result was therefore a 
continuing military stalemate which would provide opportunities for Russian 
diplomacy to support a political resolution given its privileged access to the Syrian 
government. As such, the Russian diplomatic success in 2013 over the chemical 
weapons issue, which expressly averted a Western intervention, followed a logic 
which exposed the doubts and anxieties lying below the surface of much elite and 
popular thinking in Europe and the US. 
 
 This diplomatic success did come with some significant costs. In the Middle 
East, one of the legacies of Russia’s Middle East policy during the 2000s was its 
success in courting both moderate and radical forces in the region and to advance 
mutually beneficial economic relations with countries which formerly had poor 
relations with Russia, such as Turkey, Israel and the Gulf states (Dannreuther 2012; 
Katz 2012).  But these mutually beneficial relations, most notably with the Gulf 
states, were strongly threatened by Russia’s position on Syria. For example, there was 
a serious deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the two countries 
providing the strongest support to the opposition to the Asad regime. In July 2012, the 
Russian ambassador to Qatar was beaten up at the airport in Doha and lucrative 
economic deals were cancelled with both countries. Although the amount of economic 
trade between Russia and the Gulf region is actually quite limited, the deterioration in 
political relations followed a significant rapprochement which included Putin’s 
official visit to the region in 2007, the first such visit by a Russian or a Soviet leader. 
The strategic objective for Russia had been to forge closer diplomatic ties so that 
common interests over international oil and gas markets could be promoted more 
effectively.  These tentative initial steps to forging closer relations in the Gulf region 
were undoubtedly affected by the confrontation over Syria.  
 
 More generally in the Middle East, the image of Russia was negatively 
affected by the events in Syria. In Egypt, a key indicator of grassroots Arab 
sentiments, the share of positive opinion of Russia dropped from 50% in 2007 to 16% 
in 2012; in Jordan the approval rate was just 25% and in Turkey it was 16%. Highly 
influential Islamic thinkers adopted an increasingly critical stance towards Russia, 
with the internationally renowned theologian, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, calling on Al-
Jazeera for Muslims to boycott Russia which, he claimed, ‘was supporting the 
criminal Syrian regime with weapons supplies’ (al-Qaradawi, 2012). As a senior 
Russian diplomat expresses it, ‘at the grassroots level Moscow is consistently 
presented as one of the forces checking the “democratic” impulses of the region’s 
peoples; it is assumed that Russia is getting rich on weapon deliveries to the region 
torn apart by conflicts and on the fuel prices which went up because of the continued 
bloodshed in fuel-producing countries’ (Lukmanov, 2013, p. 102). Some Russian 
analysts also unfavourably contrasted Russia with the European Union over the period 
of the Arab Spring, where Russia was viewed as ‘arming the dictators’ while the EU 
promotes its ‘soft power’ image and distances itself from the United States.  (Ivanov 
2013b). 
 
 The seeming one-sided support for Syria and the leadership of Bashar Asad 
also affected Russia’s relations with the West and contributed to a significant cooling 
in relations. One Russian analyst suggested that by early 2013 the ‘wave of anti-US 
fervour has reached heights perhaps not seen since the reign of Joseph 
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Stalin’(Kiselov, 2013). Although this was undoubtedly exaggerated, the potential  
damage to Russia’s relations with the West have been a matter of concern for Russian 
diplomats.  While there has been a clear shift towards a more confrontational anti-
Western stance with Putin’s return to the Presidency in 2012, and the Syrian crisis has 
been a litmus test of this, Russian diplomats have consistently tried to present Russia 
as an external power which seeks to promote a constructive resolution of the  conflict 
in Syria so long as Russia’s core strategic interests are protected. In March 2012, 
Russia accepted a UN Presidential statement which urged Syria to accept the peace 
plan put forward by the UN special envoy, Kofi Annan. This plan detailed an 
‘inclusive political process’, a ceasefire, and a withdrawal of forces by both sides. 
Russia also voted for UN Security Council Resolution 2042 which established a short-
lived monitoring mission. Similarly, Russia did cooperate with the UN-supported 
‘Action Group’ on Syria and supported the proposals for a Syrian-led transition as set 
out in the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012.  In May 2013, Russia and the United 
States agreed to promote an international conference based on this June 2012 
Communiqué, which was eventually convened in February 2014.  
 
 There were, therefore, precedents for a more constructive and cooperative 
Russian-US stance. This provided the basis for the passing of UN Security Council 
Resolution 2118 in September 2013 which obligated the destruction of Syria’s 
chemical weapons stockpiles. Russia’s forceful diplomatic action to support and 
promote this resolution came with some significant political risks, as Russia’s 
reputation and credibility inevitably became hostage to the Syrian government’s 
willingness and commitment to such a process. In this regard, although the resolution 
did not explicitly endorse an automatic punitive response to violations of the 
agreement, there was nevertheless reference to a chapter seven provision which 
recognised that such coercive actions would be forthcoming if there were such 
verified violations. The fact that there was a reference to chapter seven in the wording 
of the resolution did represent a significant compromise for Russia.  
 
 In the aftermath of the vote, Putin was also careful not to boast of a Russian 
victory and to highlight it as a collective and mutually advantageous result which 
potentially heralded a more constructive and cooperative relationship between Russia 
and the West. There was clearly a sense in Moscow that the crisis in Syria had led to a 
dangerous deterioration in relations with the West and that this needed to be actively 
changed. Thus, the chemical weapons agreement was used to bolster US-Russian ties 
rather than, as could easily have been the case, to further embarrass Obama’s 
weakness and strategic vacillation. The desire for Putin to have a good Sochi Winter 
Olympics in 2014 also concentrated minds in seeking to ameliorate Russia’s external 
image, which resulted in the freeing of Mikhail Khodorkovksii and the Pussy Riot 
protestors. In this context, the Russian diplomatic effort was focused on seeking to put 
the conflicts and tensions over Syria into the past and to concentrate on multilateral 
cooperation to seek a positive settlement of the Syrian civil war. 
 
Understanding Russia’s Approach to the Arab Spring 
  
 Periods of significant conflict and tension between Russia and the West 
inevitably highlight  Russia’s geopolitical approach to international relations, which is 
undeniably a core aspect of the Russian strategic mentality. However, this needs to be 
qualified by certain factors, particularly when examining Russia’s role towards the 
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Arab Spring and the crises in Libya and Syria. The first is that, as identified in much 
of the proceeding analysis, domestic political factors were critical in the nature and 
development of Russia’s diplomatic stance. The tense political situation within 
Russia, with the need for Putin to consolidate his position against an unprecedented 
degree of internal opposition, was critical in understanding why a resolute and 
uncompromising stance in relation to the Syrian crisis was seen as politically 
necessary for the consolidation of Putin’s domestic support. The second factor is that 
the Russian leadership were also conscious that there were potential costs in adopting 
an excessively geopolitical approach. And the third factor is that the Russian stance 
cannot be understood without recognising that Russia under Putin has developed a 
distinctive ‘Russian idea’ of the sources of political order in international relations 
and the role that democracy, civil society and the state should play in ensuring 
progressive change. There is, as such, an important ideational and socially constructed 
element in Russian strategic thinking which needs to be incorporated.  
 
 In relation to the recognition of the tension between the undoubted attractions 
of a geopolitical approach as against its potential negative consequences, this is a key 
feature in Russia’s response to the Arab Spring. It was well understood by more 
pragmatic elements in the Russian leadership that there is a fine line between the 
‘principled’  opposition to certain elements of Western strategy, such as ‘regime 
change’ or Western-promoted humanitarian intervention, and the promotion of a more 
generalized geopolitical struggle against the West, and its regional allies, which 
places Russia in a countervailing camp aligned with Syria, Iran and other rejectionist 
forces in the region. It is a fine line, however, which Russian leaders and policy 
analysts instinctively and regularly found themselves crossing, given the strengths of 
a deeper Soviet and Russian tradition of geopolitical and realist thought. For example, 
Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, noted in one interview that; 
 
 Asad has been turned into a bogeyman. But, in reality all of these groundless charges – 
that he is to blame for everything – are a cover for a big geopolitical game. The 
geopolitical map of the Middle East is once again being reformatted as different players 
seek to secure their own geopolitical positions. Many are concerned more about Iran than 
Syria. They are saying bluntly that Iran should be deprived of its closest ally, which they 
consider Asad to be’ (Vorobyov, 2012). 
The depiction of a broader geopolitical struggle also played well to a domestic 
audience, with one Russian commentator noting that criticism of domestic politics 
cannot easily be controlled by those in power but that ‘where Syria is concerned, 
geopolitics trumps objectivity…geopolitical nationalism has deep roots. Putin himself 
is a product of that culture, and not just an active media manipulator’ (Nekrasov, 
2012).  
 However, Russian diplomats remained sensitive to the limits of geopolitics, 
particularly in promoting the core goal of modernization and strengthening of the 
domestic economy. Russia is not, in this sense, the same country as the Soviet Union 
which was willing to sacrifice its economic interests for ideological and geopolitical 
commitments. Sergei Ivanov, a key political ally of Putin, presented this more 
pragmatic picture of post-Soviet Russia by stating that ‘we don’t export ideology 
anymore—we only export goods and capital’ (Ivanov 2008). When the Middle East is 
viewed from this more pragmatic economic perspective, the geopolitical interest of 
Russia in support of Syria appears strategically relatively much less significant. 
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Although much is made of the importance of the Tartus naval facility on the Syrian 
coast, the only naval base outside of the former Soviet Union, this is actually run-
down and of little military significance, only permitting temporary mooring (Allinson, 
2013). Its importance is more one rooted in nostalgia than the actual needs and 
demands of Russian naval power. Similarly, Syria is an important importer of Russian 
arms, representing 72% of its arms imports from 2007-11, but this accounts for only 
5% of Russia’s total arms deliveries abroad.  
 More generally, from the economic perspective, it is actually with Middle 
Eastern countries who have strongly supported the opposition against the Asad regime 
that Russia has the strongest and most significant economic relations. The most 
important in this regard is Turkey. Turkey has always been  R ussia’s m ost im p  
trading and economic partner in the Middle East with trade rising from about $4 
billion in the 1990s to $15 billion in 2005 and $34 billion  in 2012. R ussia accounts 
for 63% of Turkish natural gas imports thanks to a dedicated gas export line between 
the two countries—Blue Stream—which started supplying gas in 2003. In Russia, 
Turkish construction companies, as well as consumer goods companies, are very 
active, and Turkish investments in Russia are estimated to total $5 billion 
(Akhmedkhanov 2008).. However, the Syrian crisis undoubtedly threatened to put at 
risk these Russian economic interests. In  September 2012, Prime Minister Recep 
Tayipp Erdogan, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party,  explicitly 
included Russia among those countries that ‘history will not forgive for assisting the 
bloody Syrian regime’. A few weeks after that speech, the Turkish air force grounded 
a Russian passenger plane on a Moscow-Damascus journey (Glazova, 2012). 
  
 In fact, what one can draw from this is that a Soviet-style reflexive 
geopolitical approach no longer correlates with the actual post-Soviet ‘national 
interests’ of Russia. As such, a realist or geopolitical analysis is insufficient for 
understanding why Russia acted the way it did and was willing to take such potential 
political and economic risks. To understand this requires recognition of the role that 
ideational and ideological factors played.   
 
 Critical to this was the fact that the Arab Spring and developments in Libya 
and Syria coincided with a shift in ideological orientation of the Russian political 
system and its sources of political legitimation. During Medvedev’s presidency, the 
key overarching political agenda was defined in terms of modernization, involving the 
need for the Russian economy to diversify away from its dependence on raw materials 
and towards a more technologically advanced manufacturing and services economy. 
This agenda incorporated a generally favourable attitude towards both the West and 
the more liberal, modernizing sections of Russian society. However, with that 
liberalizing domestic constituency becoming increasingly vocal in its criticisms and 
opposition to the ruling regime during the course of 2011-12, the electoral logic for 
securing Putin’s re-election required involved focusing attention on consolidating the 
support of the more traditional and conservative majority of Russian society found in 
the rural and Soviet legacy industrial heartlands (Trenin, Lipmann, and Malashenko, 
2013). This meant not only a shift to a more openly confrontational posture towards 
the West but also a stronger and more forceful critique of the Western ideas perceived 
to be driving the opposition forces within Russian society.  
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 In the mid-2000s, much of the ideological spadework for this anti-Western and 
anti-liberal critique had been completed with the development of the concept of 
‘sovereign democracy’. Vladislav Surkov, the key intellectual figure behind this 
concept, argued that the form of democracy appropriate to Russian society, and by 
extension to other modernizing and industrializing societies, is one where the state has 
the primary role in managing the transition to democracy, ensuring that the resulting 
societal transformation does not lead to disorder and conflict but  preserves social 
stability and economic development (Surkov, 2006). As such, the intellectual core of 
the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ is a rejection of liberal pluralist conceptions of 
democracy which require the division of society into competing factional groups. For 
Surkov and other Russian elites, the danger is that, in the Russian context, this 
pluralistic conception would only lead to internal disorder, societal conflict and the 
loss of the ‘sovereign’ integrity of the state. Such a liberal pluralist concept of the 
state might be appropriate for advanced post-industrial Western societies, where the 
underlying political culture is sufficiently consensual to permit such open dissension 
without undermining the integrity of the state. However, the ‘sovereign democracy’ 
concept articulated the view that this was not appropriate for those states, including 
Russia, which have a different inherited historical and political culture, and where any 
attempt to implement this would lead to the loss of sovereignty or ‘de-
sovereignization’ (Averre, 2009, p. 1697). 
 
 There was also an inter-confessional and inter-ethnic dimension to this 
conservative statist conception of the appropriate forms of political order in complex 
internally divided societies, which draws from Russia’s post-Soviet development. In 
developing Russia’s strategy to deal with Islamist extremism, Putin developed a 
religio-political as well as a coercive military dimension. This involved a pro-active 
policy of supporting, both politically and financially, Muslim religious representation 
through a tightly regulated and hierarchically configured sphere of moderate Russian-
rooted Islam. This shift towards a more differentiated conception of the secular nature 
of the Russian state, which accords a greater role to the religious identities in Russia, 
was carefully articulated so as to extend beyond the Russian Orthodox church to 
include the other ‘traditional religions’, most notably Islam. Tatar Muslims were 
recognised as the indigenous population of Russia and should be considered ‘co-
constructors of the Russian state’ (Naumkin, 2006). The Russian leadership has 
generally been careful in articulating the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of 
the Russian state, the importance of asserting a civic (Rossiiski) rather than an ethnic 
(Russkii) Russian identity, and how Russia does not subscribe to the ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis.  
 
 This sense that Russia is distinctive in its tolerance of religious, ethnic and 
confessional difference is not just an elite phenomenon but has a broader popular 
base, as indicated in a survey which asked Russians to identify the core values of the 
European Union as against Russia (figure 1). While the values of the EU were 
identified to be those classically aligned with liberal democracy, such as the market 
economy, human rights, the rule of law and democracy, the core values of Russia 
were defined in terms of respect of different cultures and religions, of toleration and 
of preservation of cultural heritage. This survey is suggestive that there might be 
broad societal support for the Russian claim that, though European values of liberal 
democracy are something to aspire towards, they do potentially represent a threat to 
traditional values of toleration and respect for minority rights, particularly if promoted 
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through external coercive intervention. The Russian model is one that is seen 
therefore as a potentially attractive export to the non-Western world. As one 
influential Russian report argues, Russia’s advantage in the Middle East is that it 
‘comes across as a civilisationally close state, in a significant measure belonging to 
both Europe and Asia, the Christian and Islamic worlds, and not expressing to the 
world European “hyper-secularism” which is not welcome to Middle Eastern 
societies, particularly in the post-Spring period’ (Ivanov, 2013b, p. 24.) 
 
 There is, therefore, little that was apologetic or defensive in the Russian 
approach to the Arab Spring. From Moscow’s perspective, the Russian experience, 
forged through a long association and engagement with the Muslim world, is that 
social stability and multi-ethnic and multi-confessional toleration in Muslim societies 
are fragile social commodities which can rapidly be broken apart in periods of radical 
social change.  This contributed to the immediate and instinctive support for the Asad 
regime not just because it is a longstanding ally of Russia but also because it is seen to  
defend the interests of the minorities in Syria and seeks to preserve the traditions of 
multi-confessional toleration, despite the authoritarian nature of the regime. As such, 
the most effective way to resolve the Syrian crisis is not the unconditional demand for 
Asad’s overthrow but a externally-supported process of negotiations between all the 
parties to the conflict. For Russia, the Western interpretation of support for democracy 
as meaning support for the Syrian opposition, whose principal constituency is the 
Sunni majority population, unintentionally but inevitably strengthens radical and 
extremist elements that are intolerant of all difference, seek to eliminate their 
opponents and unashamedly use the instruments of fear and terrorism. It is for this 
reason that Putin has regularly cited the rise of the terrorist group, Jabhat al-Nusri, 
among the opposition and has highlighted the atrocities that the group have 
committed. For Putin, the rise of such extremist forces in the Syrian conflict, and how 
this has intensified the brutality of the conflict more generally, is the result of a 
misguided and fundamentally misconceived Western policy. 
Conclusion  
 This article has sought to identify the key factors explaining the evolution of 
Russia’s stance towards the Arab Spring and the conflicts that developed in Libya and 
Syria. While recognizing that geopolitical factors were undoubtedly important for 
understanding the distinctive position adopted by Russia, which was both sceptical of 
the democratic potential of the Arab Spring and strongly opposed to any external 
military intervention, the article has highlighted the critical roles that domestic 
political and ideational factors played in the articulation of Russia’s strategic posture.  
 The larger and more critical message that Russia sought to present and defend 
in its response to the Arab Spring was a distinctive ‘Russian idea’ over the nature of 
political order which explicitly critiques and challenges the idea of Western-promoted 
liberal democracy. The essence of this ‘Russian idea’ is that democracy needs to be 
thought as something which strengthens rather than fragments social stability, that 
preserves rather than destroys local traditions and religious cultures, and  that 
consolidates rather than breaks apart sovereign states. From this Russian perspective, 
the West utilizes liberal democracy as an instrument militarily to enforce their 
preferred ‘democratic’ partners through intervention on putatively humanitarian 
grounds. In contrast to this, Russia presents a model which is conservative in its 
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support of the overriding need of the state to defend its sovereign rights of state and to 
respond to the societal demands for reform. For this Russian perspective, such change 
can only come from within and cannot be imposed from outside. Compared to the 
1990s or even early 2000s, Russia now feels much more confident about promoting 
this essentially authoritarian Russian model of state power since it is supported by 
China and by a number of other emerging powers.  
   The Middle East is not, however, the most important site for this Russian 
attempt to promote its own model of the state. The struggle to articulate a convincing 
alternative to the Western and, in particular, the European normative idea of 
democracy is being much more forcefully waged in the so-called ‘shared 
neighbourhood’ in East and Central Europe and in the Caucasus. In Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia is seeking to counter the ‘soft 
power’ projection of the European Union with the alternative of a Eurasian process of 
integration into a more statist, hierarchically constituted, but stable and ‘traditional’ 
set of structures. The Russian intervention into Georgia in 2008 has similarities to the 
Russian action towards Syria in that the overriding aim was to limit Western 
intervention and the move into the Western sphere of democracy. However, the 
longer-term struggle between the EU/West and Russia for the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the peoples of the former Soviet Union, as with the peoples of the Middle East, is far 
from resolved and will continue to be seriously challenged by the natural human 
















FIGURE 1   
VALUES CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EU AND RUSSIA IN PUBLIC OPINION (PER CENT) 
 
 
Notes: The wording of the question was as follows: ‘Which of the following values are most 
attributable to the EU (five answers maximum)?’ and ‘Which of these values are more 
attributable to your country?’ The question offered the opportunity to choose several 
positions, so the sum of the indicators may exceed 100 per cent. 
Source: Nation-wide survey, conducted in November 2008 by the Centre for Sociological 
Research ‘Opinio’, Moscow State University, under the ESRC-funded project (RES-061-25- 
0001). 
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